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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 When the Defense Department rescinded the ban 
on women in combat positions, it effectively undermined 
the presumption of female inferiority that had for years 
closed opportunities for women in the military, in sports, 
and in other fields.  In her Second Amended Complaint 
(“SAC”), Tamika Covington, who has been a basketball 
official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for over ten 
years, alleges gender employment
1
 discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e, et seq., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1, et seq. 
(“NJLAD”), because she has been excluded from 
                                              
1
 Title VII and Title IX prohibit discrimination based on sex.  
The District Court used “gender” and “sex” interchangeably, 




officiating at boys‟ high school varsity basketball games.  
Without hearing argument on the merits of Covington‟s 
central claim, the District Court dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice against all defendants and ordered the case 





Covington brings her suit against various entities 
that have some role in high school athletics in New 
Jersey.  She names as defendants the International 
Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 
(“Board 193”), the principal defendant, which assigns 
officials to officiate at regular season high school 
basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic 
Athletic Association (“NJSIAA”), the entity that controls 
and supervises post-season tournament games and 
assigns officials to referee those games; the International 
Association of Approved Basketball Officials 
(“IAABO”), the Colonial Valley Conference (“CVC”), 
the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a 
school at which Covington has officiated, and Fred 
Dumont, the President of Board 193.
2
    Covington 
alleges that Hamilton, CVC, and NJSIAA are liable 
under Title VII as her employers; Board 193 is liable as 
an employment agency; NJSIAA and IAABO are 
                                              
2
 Covington does not assert any federal claims against 




vicariously liable as Board 193‟s principals; and CVC is 
vicariously liable as Hamilton‟s principal.   
 
The essence of Covington‟s claim is that Board 
193 has not assigned her to officiate at boys‟ regular 
season games because of its policy discriminating against 
women, that NJSIAA has not assigned her to officiate at 
boys‟ post-season games for the same reason, and that 
the other defendants have assisted in that policy.
3
 Despite 
the absence or scarcity of women referees assigned to 
boys‟ varsity games, none of the defendants has 
conceded that it employed a policy to exclude females 
from a position officiating in boys‟ basketball 
tournaments and there is no document that so provides.
4
  
In the absence of any written policy, Covington alleges a 
pattern and practice of discrimination.  The District Court 
did not address Covington‟s allegations of discrimination 
on the merits, instead dismissing on other grounds.  
 
                                              
3
The issue of whether Covington was not assigned to boys‟ 
games due to her qualifications or for an illegitimate 
discriminatory reason is not before us today.  However, we 
note that in oral argument, counsel for NJSIAA stated that 
NJSIAA has never assigned female referees, including 
Covington, to boys‟ post-season games.   Furthermore, 
counsel for Covington stated that Covington was only 
assigned to boys‟ regular season varsity games after this 
lawsuit was brought.      
4
 It is unlikely that any female will believe that there wasn‟t a 
trace of discrimination if only males were uniformly selected 




The District Court granted judgment on the 
pleadings on Covington‟s original Complaint, holding 
that Covington did not adequately plead her employment 
by Board 193 or IAABO as required by Title VII, and 
that Covington did not allege that Hamilton received 
federal financial assistance as required to state a Title IX 
claim.  Covington sought to remedy these deficiencies by 
filing the SAC.  It is that document that is before us now. 
 
The District Court then issued an Order to Show 
Cause, asking Covington to explain why the SAC should 
not be dismissed.  Covington filed a reply, and the parties 
had extensive discovery.  The Court dismissed the SAC 
without oral argument, holding that Covington had not 
adequately alleged facts sufficient to establish an 
employer-employee or other relationship necessary to 
hold defendants liable under Title VII.  The Court also 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law claims.  
 
The District Court cited Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009), in support of its dismissal.  
However, those cases do not provide a panacea for 
defendants.  Instead, they merely require that plaintiff 
raise a “plausible claim for relief.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679.  Although it is established that under the Twombly 
and Iqbal pleading standards, “[f]actual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, those cases make it 




the facts upon which he bases his claim.”  Id. at 555 n.3 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) 
(emphasis omitted).  The pleading standard “is not akin 
to a „probability requirement‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); to survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a “plausible 
claim for relief.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.  
 
It appears that counsel who filed the original 
complaint relied for the plausibility of its claim of gender 
discrimination on the success of a similar claim in 
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic 
Association Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  In 
that case, the district court upheld a jury verdict for an 
excluded female official who officiated Pennsylvania 
high school basketball games.  In dismissing Covington‟s 
original complaint, the District Court did not conceal its 
disrespect for the Kemether opinion.  We believe that 
opinion was entitled to more serious regard than it was 
given by the District Court in light of the similarity of the 
structure of the sport in the two states, the plaintiffs‟ 
claims, and the jury verdict for Kemether in the Eastern 




 Covington, like Kemether, alleges violation of 
Title VII and Title IX.  The District Court had 
jurisdiction over the Title VII and Title IX claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over the 




jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  This court reviews de novo a district court‟s 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.  See 
Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Title VII states, in part, that it is an “unlawful 
employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual‟s . . . sex . . . or (2) to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities . . . because of 
such individual‟s . . . sex.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
(emphasis added).    
 
Congress enacted Title VII “for the ameliorative 
purpose of eradicating prohibited forms of discrimination 
from the workplace.”  Martin v. United Way of Erie 
Cnty., 829 F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1987).  The intent of 
the statute is to “drive employers to focus on 
qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 243 (1989).  Instead of meeting Covington‟s 
discrimination allegations, the defendants argue they are 
not covered by the provisions of the antidiscrimination 
statutes because they are not encompassed within the 
definitions of the relevant statutes; in other words, they 
are free to discriminate.  Presumably, they would be as 
free to discriminate on the basis of race as well as sex.  




exclude school sports officials from the ameliorative 
provisions of Titles VII and IX, which is what the 
District Court‟s narrow reading of the relevant statutory 
language would accomplish.   
 
In order to state a Title VII claim, Covington must 
allege an employment relationship with the defendants.  
To determine whether Covington is an employee, we 
look to the factors set forth in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).  We 
agree with the District Court when it reads our case law 
to focus the employment relationship analysis on “the 
level of control the defendant[s]. . . exerted over the 
plaintiff: which entity paid [the employees‟] salaries, 
hired and fired them, and had control over their daily 
employment activities.”  Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of 
Approved Basketball Officials, No. 08-3639, 2010 WL 
3404977, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2010).  Because 
Hamilton has some input as to which officials are 
assigned to each game, chooses the time, date, and 
location of the games, and pays the officials for their 
work during the basketball games, with payment for 
work generally understood as one of the principal indicia 
of an employer-employee relationship, we hold that 




                                              
5At this stage of the litigation, we must accept as true all 
factual allegations in the SAC and all reasonable inferences 






Another defendant Covington lists as an employer, 
NJSIAA, is an athletic organization made up of high 
schools in New Jersey.  It controls the post-season 
tournaments, directly assigns officials to post-season 
games, and pays the referees for their work in the post-
season.  Officials who are chosen for post-season games 
must be dues-paying members of NJSIAA, enter into 
agreements with NJSIAA, and sign liability waivers.  
NJSIAA provides the officials with liability insurance.  
NJSIAA plays a role in training the officials and has the 
power to certify and register them.  Officials are required 
to abide by NJSIAA rules and regulations while 
officiating.  Officials wear a uniform prescribed by 
NJSIAA, which identifies them as NJSIAA officials.   It 
follows from the foregoing that at this preliminary stage, 
we accept Covington‟s claim that NJSIAA is liable as an 
employer for post-season games.   
 
Our examination of Covington‟s allegations 
related to CVC shows no similar relationship.  CVC does 
not pay officials and does not contribute to their training 
or evaluation.  Therefore, we reject Covington‟s 
allegation that CVC is liable as her employer under Title 
VII. 
 
Looking to the final principal defendant, Board 
193, Covington argues that it fits within the definition of 
an employment agency.  An “employment agency” is 
defined under Title VII as “any person regularly 




employees for an employer or to procure for employees 
opportunities to work for an employer and includes an 
agent of such a person.”  §2000e(c).  Board 193 does not 
deny that it comes within the Title VII definition of 
employment agency.  However, it states that it cannot be 
liable because to be liable as an employment agency, 
there has to be an employment relationship between 
Covington and Hamilton.  As stated above, Covington 
has adequately pled an employment relationship with 
Hamilton.  Therefore, Board 193 is liable as an 
employment agency.  In summary, Covington has 
plausibly alleged an employment relationship with 
Hamilton for regular season games, with NJSIAA for 
post-season games, and with Board 193 as an 
employment agency. 
 
Covington asserts that NJSIAA, IAABO, and CVC 
are vicariously liable for the asserted Title VII violations.  
“„An agency relationship is created when one party 
consents to have another act on its behalf, with the 
principal controlling and directing the acts of the agent.‟”  
AT& T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421, 1434 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Sears Mortg. 
Corp. v. Rose, 634 A.2d 74, 79 (N.J. 1993)).  Vicarious 
liability due to an agency relationship can be based on 
the agent‟s actual authority.  “An agent acts with actual 
authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal 
consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably 
believes, in accordance with the principal‟s 
manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the 




(2006).  Vicarious liability can also be based on apparent 
authority.  “„Apparent authority arises in those situations 
where the principal causes persons with whom the agent 
deals to reasonably believe that the agent has authority‟ 
despite the absence of an actual agency relationship.”  
Winback, 42 F.3d at 1439 (quoting Barticheck v. Fidelity 
Union Bank/First Nat’l State, 680 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 
(D.N.J. 1988)).   
 
Board 193 is a chapter of NJSIAA.  NJSIAA 
provides training and evaluation requirements for Board 
193 officials, and requires them to attend certain 
meetings, at which NJSIAA rules are reviewed.  
Covington has shown that NJSIAA has some control, 
particularly in training and evaluation, of the basketball 
officials.  However, we see nothing to support 
Covington‟s allegation that NJSIAA is vicariously liable 
for Board 193‟s actions. 
 
Covington also alleges that IAABO is a principal 
of Board 193.  IAABO, which is a worldwide 
organization, provides curricula and training materials for 
basketball officials.  IAABO retains some authority to 
discipline Board 193 members.  We gave Covington the 
opportunity to explain IAABO‟s connection with this 
action but, from the information provided, it appears that 
it has no connection with the assignment of officials to 
games.  IAABO does not have sufficient control over 
Board 193 so as to be its principal.  We therefore have no 





Finally, Covington states there is an agency 
relationship between CVC and Hamilton.  However, she 
does not adequately allege that CVC has control over 
Hamilton so as to be vicariously liable.
6
   
 
                               III. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will remand this 
matter to the District Court to give Covington an 
opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against 
Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA.  We will affirm the 
District Court‟s dismissal of Covington‟s claim against 
the CVC and IAABO.   
 
                                              
6
 Although Covington supplemented her allegations with 
respect to Title IX alleging Hamilton‟s receipt of federal 
funds, her Title IX claim is inadequate because she does not 
allege an official policy of discrimination at Hamilton and 
does not allege that an individual with authority to address the 
discrimination had actual knowledge of the discrimination.  
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 
(1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
